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The 2008 global financial crisis was much more severe than the 1997 
Asian crisis.  Thus, ceteris paribus and barring a serious nonlinearity, 
Korea‟s economy should have done worse in 2008 than a decade ago.  
However, the opposite seems to be true.  This paper examines factors 
behind such a puzzling outcome.  Another issue raised is potential 
long lasting impacts of the recent crisis.  Since the 1997 crisis, the 
average growth rate of real GDP has been noticeably lower.  Given 
serious welfare implications of such deceleration, one cannot but 
wonder about similar long term effects of the current crisis going 
forward. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper looks at the experiences of the Korea‟s economy through two 
major crises of 1998 and 2008, both of which had been triggered by large 
external financial shocks.  In the first instance, Korea was the last economy 
that had been dragged into a whirlpool of foreign exchange crises that had 
started in Thailand in the summer of 1997, and moved eastward touching 
many regional economies leaving some standing damaged (Malaysia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong), taking others down into the pool (Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Korea in chronological order) by December.  The affected 
economies share a common symptom of not being able to defend their 
exchange regimes of adjustable peg as they ran out of foreign exchange 
reserves in the face of large outflow of foreign capital started by a loss of 
confidence as well as speculative positioning by international investors.  
Each affected economy had common as well as idiosyncratic causes as to 
how such a downward cycle initially got started.  Opaqueness about the 
extent of non-performing assets of financial sectors as well as their foreign 
exchange reserves situations was a common thread.  Commercial real estate 
lending in Thailand and high reliance on external funds by large businesses 
in Korea were examples of idiosyncratic factors.  Anyhow, the four 
economies that ended up getting emergency infusion of foreign exchanges 
from the International Monetary Fund went through periods of varying 
degrees of contraction.  Korea experienced particularly steepest fall in 
output and a large devaluation of the Korean won in 1998.  Despite being 
the highest income country among the four IMF aided economies and being 
the one with the largest GDP, in retrospect Korea was still quite vulnerable to 
external shocks as a small open economy. 
After a decade later, international financial markets came close to a 
meltdown led by major failures in the US financial system in 2008.  In 
many regards, the recent crisis easily surpasses the Asian financial crisis of a 
decade ago.  However, simply put, Korea‟s economy fared much better this 
time.  Immediately following the Lehman Brothers failure in September 
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2008, things looked very precarious for Korea.  The Korean won/US dollar 
exchange rate as well as credit risk premia on internationally traded Korean 
papers shot up, and financial institutions were under heavy pressure for they 
could not roll over their short term external borrowings from international 
lenders.  In Korea, a sense of déjà-vu was widespread.  There were some 
harsh self criticisms blaming the government and businesses for 
implementing insufficient reforms in the bygone years only to repeat the 
painful adjustments all over again within a decade.  However, things 
improved rapidly by mid spring 2009, and consequently unusually 
heightened risk indicators of interest rates and exchange rates subsided 
noticeably. 
It appears safe to say that the 2008 global financial crisis was much more 
serious than the 1997 Asian crisis in terms of its breadth and width (not many 
have protested the dubbing of the recent crisis as the most severe one since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s).  And given that Korea has become a 
more open „small open economy‟ in 2008, it is puzzling how she appeared so 
less scathed in the wake of the bigger shock of 2008 than that of 1997.  That 
is, ceteris paribus, and barring a significant nonlinearity of the economic 
system, Korea‟s economy should have done worse in 2008 than a decade ago 
in response to more significant external adverse shock.  This raises an 
interesting question about why the Korea‟s economy did worse in 1997-1998 
than in 2008.
1)
 
Another important issue is potential long term effects of the recent crisis.  
A casual observation tells us that there had been a noticeable step-down of 
average growth rate of real GDP after the 1997 crisis.  That is, events of the 
1997 crisis seemed to have lowered the trend growth rate of Korea by at least 
2 percentage points.  Welfare implications of such a sustained deceleration 
                                           
1) There are different ways of drawing implications from financial crises, such as focusing on 
general properties of causes, propagations, and effects on real activity (Kindleberger, 1996; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, though Kindleberger offered detailed accounts of individual 
financial crises in addition to such a generalization).  The focus of our investigation is to 
learn more about the Korean economy itself by looking at how she responded to external 
shocks differently between two separate episodes. 
Chan-Guk Huh · Kwanghee Nam 4 
are large.  So it is natural that one wonders about whether there is going to 
be a similar long term impact in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis.
2)
 
This paper attempts to answer these questions by taking a careful bird-eye-
view of the whole terrain.  It would afford us more promising conjectures to 
be tested in later studies.  Experiences of the Korean economy warrant a 
more careful treatment as she represents a successful small open economy 
with a fairly well developed financial as well as real sectors with important 
domestic idiosyncratic factors.  Of course this is not to deny applicability of 
common methodologies focusing on relationships between a set of 
macroeconomic variables.  An outbreak of a major crisis suggests a 
breakdown of mechanisms of usual interactions among price and quantity 
variables due to some extraordinary factors.  Catastrophic events require 
looking into circumstances going beyond the usual suspects.  This paper‟s 
examinations should offer two interesting cross section data of the Korean 
economy undergoing major external shocks within a decade.  Hopefully it 
will shed some light on how best to prepare for unwelcome but unavoidable 
adverse external shocks in the future.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 offers an overview 
of both 1997 and 2008 crises focusing on both financial markets and 
macroeconomic developments around each episodes.  Section 3 discusses 
consequences of the crises on output and employment growth trends and 
their significance.  Section 4 summarizes key factors that contributed to 
engendering different outcomes of two crises, and offers policy implications 
and areas for future research. 
 
                                           
2) This experience brings out an interesting point regarding the nature of, or how to interpret 
the 1997 crisis.  The most common macroeconomic analytical framework of explaining 
fluctuations in recent period is to view it as a combination of growth trend with cyclical 
fluctuations as used by Lucas (1987, 2003).  In that framework Lucas showed that welfare 
cost associated with fluctuations to be relatively small, thus finding little utility for 
stabilization efforts.  There has been steady flow of studies that either support Lucas‟s 
interpretation or that disagree (see, references in Lucas, 2003, as well as Yellen and Akerlof, 
2006; Gali et al., 2007).  However, Korea‟s experience since 1997 points to a long lasting 
and quantitatively significant impact of the big fluctuation around 1998.  This is an issue 
that will require further careful study. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE TWO CRISES 
     
2.1. Macroeconomic and Financial Conditions of 1997 
 
There are many direct and indirect factors that led to the event of 1997.  
Given that the crisis itself is termed as „the 1997 foreign exchange crisis‟ due 
to the shortage of the foreign exchange reserves in the face of capital outflow, 
looking at the external balances of Korea in the relevant period seems to be a 
good starting point.  In the early 1990s, Korea started to liberalize, albeit 
partially, its capital account that had been closed.  It was part of over-
arching efforts by the new government of the president Yong Sam Kim to 
decentralize and improve qualitative aspects of the Korean economy that had 
grown rapidly based on active leadership of bureaucrats.  However, the 
system of a government controlled fund allocation, which in turn implied 
socialization of credit risks, was more or less still in place when the door to 
international investors opened.  High interest rates due to chronic shortages 
of funds by businesses (see figure 1), coupled with a slow moving exchange 
rate under the adjustable peg system (see figure 2), meant high return with 
relatively low risk for international investors.
3)
  Hence, foreign investment 
fund started to flow rapidly into the Korean bond market, which meant 
appreciation pressure on the exchange rate.  There is nothing unusual about 
this from the perspective of international financial market participants.  
However, it was indeed an unusual development for Korean policy makers.  
Until then, the main factor that affected the exchange value of the currency 
had been external trade balances.  For example, inflow of portfolio 
investment rose from U$0.66 billion (1992) to U$11 billion in 1993 and 
U$21.5 billion in 1996.  In comparison, Korea‟s merchandise exports rose 
at a more measured pace from U$65 billion to U$82.2 billion in 1993 and 
U$129.7 billion in 1996. 
 
                                           
3) This characterization of Korea‟s exchange rate regime is due to Dooley, Dornbusch, and 
Park (2002). 
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Figure 1 Short and Long Term Interest Rates 
(January 1991-August 2009) 
 
 
Figure 2 Korean Won Exchange Rate vs U$, Yen 
(January 3, 1991-September 17, 2009) 
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Table 1 Growth Contribution of GDP Components (1991-2000) 
 
Private 
Consumption 
Government 
Consumption 
Domestic 
Demand 
(1) 
Net 
Exports 
(2) 
(1) + (2) 
GDP 
Growth 
1991 5.0 0.9 11.8 –2.60 9.2 9.4 
1992 3.5 1.0 4.6 0.74 5.3 5.9 
1993 3.5 0.8 5.8 0.71 6.6 6.1 
1994 4.9 0.6 11.2 –2.36 8.8 8.5 
1995 5.7 0.7 10.2 –1.55 8.7 9.2 
1996 3.9 1.0 9.0 –1.78 7.2 7.0 
1997 1.9 0.3 0.1 4.25 4.4 4.7 
1998 –7.7 0.3 –18.4 11.29 –7.1 –6.9 
1999 6.1 0.4 13.0 –2.91 10.1 9.5 
2000 4.6 0.2 8.0 0.29 8.3 8.5 
Average 3.1 0.6 5.5 0.6 6.1 6.2 
Source: The Bank of Korea, GDP measured in 2000 prices. 
 
Such significant capital inflows and accompanied exchange rate 
appreciation pressure seemed to have complicated choices for the Korea 
foreign exchange authority in the face of continued and worsening current 
account deficit.  In fact, ever growing negative net exports had made 
negative contribution to output growth for three consecutive years from 1994 
to 1996 (table 1).  Such a worsening external balance would ordinarily have 
made policy makers intervene to induce the exchange rate‟s depreciation by 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves.  The foreign exchange reserve 
indeed rose in this period, but not sufficiently as the Won exchange rate 
stayed below 800 won per dollar between October 1994 and June 1996. 
An almost chronic excess demand, for example the debt to equity ratio of 
large manufacturing firms was over 300% in 1996 (table 3), for outside funds 
by businesses was one of the key reasons for the capital inflow.
4)
  That, in 
                                           
4) See Krueger and Yoo (2002) for more detailed discussion of the financial conditions of 
Korean businesses in the period leading up to 1997 crisis. 
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turn, strengthened the exchange value of won.  Both short and long term (3 
years) interest rates remained well above 10% in the 1990s as can be seen in 
figure 1, reflecting such an excess demand condition.  Interest rates in most 
advanced economies were generally lower in the same period, especially in 
Japan where they fell below 5% in the early 1990s.  External borrowings, 
mainly by Korean banks, also grew.  Not only that, the external borrowings 
concentrated at the short end of maturity were problematic as banks typically 
used them as a funding source for their long term lending, thus creating a 
maturity mismatch.  Table 2 shows that, at the end of 1994, the short term 
borrowings were U$38.5 billion out of the total external debt of U$89.8 
billion (154% and 359% of FX reserves, and 9% and 16% of GDP, 
respectively).  In the second quarter of 1997, short term borrowings were 
U$83.6 billion out the total U$174.4 billion (251% and 524% of FX reserves 
of the second quarter of 1997, 16% and 34% of GDP, respectively).  
It is interesting to note that the Korean FX regulation that actually favored 
short term over long term borrowings was an important contributing factor 
for the concentration of borrowings at the short term end.
5)
  Along with this, 
there was another important problematic regulatory gap.  The Merchant 
bank industry, made up of financial institutions which did not take retail 
deposits, was in a regulatory blind spot as no particular regulatory agency 
had been in charge of overseeing them.
6)
  On top of that, as part of the 
deregulation drive, 16 new merchant banks were licensed and allowed to 
handle foreign exchange businesses.  Merchant banks engaged in highly 
risky businesses.  For example, they were not only lending to domestic 
businesses but also purchasing high yield bonds issued by Thailand and 
Russia which later ran into FX crisis of their own, rendering those bonds near 
worthless (Choi, 1998). 
                                           
5) It was in the form of long-term borrowing having to pass higher bureaucratic hurdle; for 
long-term borrowing, banks had to obtain permission from the minister of Finance, while 
there was no such requirement for short term borrowing.  Such an asymmetric regulation 
was later repealed (Choi, 1998). 
6) This was unusual because commercial banks, insurance as well as securities industries each 
had their own regulatory agencies at that time.  They were merged into a single Financial 
Services Agency later in the wake of the 1997 crisis.  
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Table 2 External Borrowings, FX Reserves, Exports, GDP 
                 (Unit: billion U$, %) 
 
Total 
Short 
Term 
Long 
Term 
ST/Total 
FX 
Reserves 
Exports GDP 
1994 89.8 38.5 51.4 43 25.0 96.0 423.4 
1995 
119.8 
(33.4) 
54.9 
(42.7) 
64.9 
(26.4) 
46 
31.9 
(27.5) 
125.1 
(30.3) 
517.1 
(22.1) 
1996 
157.4 
(31.4) 
75.9 
(38.3) 
81.5 
(25.5) 
48 
32.4 
(1.5) 
129.7 
(3.7) 
557.6 
(7.8) 
1997 
174.2 
(10.7) 
63.8 
(–16.0) 
110.5 
(35.6) 
37 
19.7 
(–39.2) 
136.2 
(5.0) 
516.3 
(–7.4) 
1998 
163.8 
(–6.0) 
39.6 
(–37.9) 
124.2 
(12.5) 
24 
52.0 
(163.6) 
132.3 
(–2.8) 
345.4 
(–33.1) 
1999 
152.9 
(–6.6) 
43.1 
(8.8) 
109.9 
(–11.5) 
28 
73.7 
(41.8) 
143.7 
(8.6) 
445.4 
(28.9) 
2000 
148.1 
(–3.1) 
49.7 
(15.3) 
98.5 
(–10.4) 
34 
95.9 
(30.1) 
172.3 
(19.9) 
533.4 
(19.8) 
2001 
128.7 
(–13.1) 
40.3 
(–18.9) 
88.4 
(–10.2) 
31 
102.5 
(6.9) 
150.4 
(–12.7) 
504.6 
(–5.4) 
2002 
141.5 
(9.9) 
48.2 
(19.6) 
93.3 
(5.5) 
34 
120.8 
(17.9) 
162.5 
(8.0) 
575.9 
(14.1) 
2003 
157.4 
(11.3) 
50.8 
(5.5) 
106.6 
(14.3) 
32 
154.5 
(27.9) 
193.8 
(19.3) 
643.8 
(11.8) 
2004 
172.3 
(9.4) 
56.3 
(10.9) 
115.9 
(8.7) 
33 
198.2 
(28.3) 
253.8 
(31.0) 
722.0 
(12.1) 
2005 
187.9 
(9.1) 
65.9 
(17.0) 
122.0 
(5.2) 
35 
210.0 
(6.0) 
284.4 
(12.0) 
844.9 
(17.0) 
2006 
260.1 
(38.4) 
113.7 
(72.6) 
146.3 
(20.0) 
44 
238.4 
(13.5) 
325.5 
(14.4) 
951.8 
(12.7) 
2007 
383.2 
(47.3) 
160.2 
(40.9) 
222.9 
(52.3) 
42 
261.8 
(9.8) 
371.5 
(14.1) 
1049.2 
(10.2) 
2008 
381.1 
(–0.5) 
151.1 
(–5.7) 
230.0 
(3.2) 
40 
200.5 
(–23.4) 
422.0 
(13.6) 
929.1 
(–11.4) 
2008Q1 
415.8 
(47) 
176.0 
(35.3) 
239.8 
(56.9) 
42 
264.2 
(8.3) 
99.4 
(17.4)  
2008Q2 
421.7 
(35.5) 
176.2 
(28.3) 
245.5 
(41.1) 
42 
258.1 
(3.0) 
114.5 
(23.1)  
2008Q3 
425.5 
(24.5) 
189.6 
(30.2) 
235.9 
(20.2) 
45 
239.7 
(–6.8) 
115.0 
(27.0)  
2008Q4 
381.1 
(–0.5) 
151.1 
(–5.7) 
230.0 
(3.2) 
40 
201 
(–23.3) 
93.1 
(–9.9)  
Source: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
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Table 3 Some Financial and Real Indicators Related to 
Manufacturing Firms (%) 
 
Debt to Equity Ratio
1) Net Interest 
Coverage Ratio
2) 
Growth Rate of 
Facility Investment
3) 
1995 286.75 N. A. 18.9 
1996 317.11 N. A. 9.1 
1997 396.25 N. A. –8.4 
1998 303.02 68.28 –40.6 
1999 214.66 96.06 37.5 
2000 210.57 157.22 32.9 
2005 100.9 525.42 5.3 
2006 98.88 439.33 8.2 
2007 107.1 435.29 9.3 
2008 97.83 415.79 –2.0 
Notes: 1) (Current liabilities + non-current liabilities)/(stockholders‟ equity). 
2) (Operating profit)/(interest expenses).  
3) National Income Account, real, chain index.  
Source: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
 
Turning to non-financial businesses, they had been heavily reliant on 
external funds and also faced rising wages.
7)
  Operating in such a strained 
environment, a string of businesses got into trouble, failing to service 
outstanding debts.  To name only those with over one trillion won (about 
U$ one billion) borrowing outstanding from financial institutions, and that 
officially entered restructuring procedures in 1997 are; Hanbo group 
(January), Jinro (April), Daenong (May), Kia (the big one with 9.5 trillion 
won, July), Haitai (November), and New Core (November). 
                                           
7) Average leverage (debt to equity) ratio of the manufacturing sector ranged from 285.5 
(1990) to 396.2 (1997) in this period. Real average wages of manufacturing sector rose at a 
double digit rate for 3 years between 1988 and 1990 before settling to 5-8% range until 
1997. Labor strikes were especially frequent between 1987 and 1994, ranging 755.8 to 
111.3 day/1,000 workers. 
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The crucial blow was the external shock that had already pushed three 
economies in the East Asian region, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, 
into currency crisis.  With international investors‟ confidence already at the 
lowest level and new business failures developing, the fact Korea was a 
member of the OECD with much higher per capita income than those 
economies that were in crisis earlier in 1997 did not matter.  A large scale 
outflow of foreign capital continued, and by November of 1997, Korea ran 
out of the FX reserves to meet redemption demand of departing capital.  
Korea went to the IMF for emergency loan facilities in early December. 
The economic contraction that followed in 1998 was very severe.  
Despite strong growth in exports that year, the real GDP fell by 6.9% due to 
extreme domestic demand contractions (see table 1).  The extent of 
contractions can be seen in figure 3.  As can be seen, contractions in real 
activity and employment were quire severe except for export shipments.  A 
sharp depreciation of the Korean won when the global demand remained not 
significantly affected by Asia‟s regional financial troubles must have helped 
Korean exporters.  The degree of severity of policy prescriptions by the 
IMF initially had been the point of contention ever since they were 
implemented beginning in December 1997 and early 1998.  The goals of 
tightening both fiscal and monetary policies were to dampen domestic 
demand to restore external balance and to stem outflow of funds.  They 
worked too well in the sense of engineering an extreme shrinkage of 
domestic demand as can be seen in table 1.  However, interest rates that shot 
above 20% in early 1998 seemed to have done more than stemming the 
outflow of capital.  As explained earlier, given the high leverage ratios of 
many businesses, both almost halving of the exchange value of the Korean 
won and punishingly high interest rates meant insurmountable obstacles to 
many highly leveraged businesses that might have survived in somewhat less 
constrictive circumstances.  The IMF policies might have aggravated the 
extent of the troubled asset problem.
8)
  
                                           
8) See Cho (2002) for discussion of a conjecture that the high interest rate policy recommended 
may have deepened the 1998 contraction, and also Krueger and Yoo (2002) for discussion 
Chan-Guk Huh · Kwanghee Nam 12 
Figure 3 Trend in Monthly Real Activity Indicators  
(January 1996-December 1999) 
      (Unit: y-o-y growth rate, %) 
 
Source: National Statistics Office. 
                                                                                                   
of a possibility that the high interest rates might have triggered the crisis, more than FX 
crisis, due to high level of leverage and low profitability of the chaebols. 
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There were massive closures of banks and businesses throughout 1998 and 
a large scale reduction in workforce.  The government had to inject huge 
sums of financial resources, not to mention emergency financial support to 
affected populace, to pay depositors of closed banks and recapitalize failed 
banks and so forth in order to restore the financial system.  In addition, the 
government set up the Korea deposit insurance corporation (KDIC) and the 
Korea asset management company (KAMCO) to handle issues related to 
depositor protection and disposition of troubled assets.
9)
  
This financial involvement of the government offers an interesting way to 
quantify the magnitude of the problem that had existed submerged due to the 
government control over the financial system, which had an important 
consequence of delaying realization of losses, and which had existed until the 
outbreak of the crisis in 1997.  As noted by many observers, Korea had only 
two instances of business failures of a significant size for almost two decades 
up until 1997.
10)
  Thus, the event of 1997 was an opportune chance to 
measure the extent of the hidden problems associated with regulatory as well 
as financial forbearance in Korea as most troubled financial institutions and 
many bad borrowers were allowed to fail.  However, the size of public fund 
injections in the period immediately following 1999 would likely to overstate 
                                           
9)  In addition, some noteworthy changes and infrastructure building took place: The first is 
prohibition of cross guaranteeing among affiliated firms when they borrow, a practice 
which exposed them to domino like spread of problem in case one firm runs into trouble; 
the second is the enactment of the Asset Securitization Act in 1998, which provided 
Korean financial institutions and corporations legal framework to securitize the non 
performing assets; another was the introduction of the private equity fund, which could 
lead to corporate restructuring buyout funds by domestic capital (Indirect Investment Fund 
Act in 2004).    
10) The Kukje group‟s failure in 1985 and Woosung Construction‟s in 1996 are the two cases.  
It is not too unrealistic to assume that there had been a few cases of de facto defunct 
businesses had remained solvent before 1997 only due to supports by banks, which in turn 
did not have experiences or willingness to deal with large scale delinquency problems.  
Government officials who had authorities over initiation as well as overall procedure 
should have no more willingness to be the first to deal with such messy problems.  To 
begin with, Korea did not have well developed legal or financial market institutions to deal 
with large scale bankruptcy cases.  Thus, the preferred way of dealing with large corporate 
problem was to arrange other firms to absorb the troubled, which was employed to deal 
with a substantial industrial restructuring in the early 1980s. 
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the problem as some of failures were presumably partly due to overly tight 
policy measures that were implemented in the initial stage of the crisis.  For 
example, both short and long term interest rates shot up close to 30% from 
10% level since December of 1997.  Thus, it would be prudent to allow for 
time lapses to avoid overestimation.  For example, it is going to take some 
time for the process of recuperation of residual values through sales of non-
performing assets of failed banks and businesses.  This is an important 
consideration for Korea in 1998 as there were no extant markets for troubled 
assets as well as many willing domestic buyers with means. 
As of the end of 2006, by which time the estimates have remained more or 
less little changed for several years, the total public fund expended since 
1998 was 168.3 trillion won.  Out of this sum, 84.5 trillion won has been 
recovered.  In addition to this, the KAMCO owns 73% of outstanding 
shares of Woori bank, which came into being as a result of multiple mergers 
of several troubled banks in the wake of the 1997 crisis, and is one of the 
largest commercial banks in Korea.  An approximate total market value of 
those shares amounts to 13 trillion won.  This calculation shows the net cost 
of financial restructuring related to the crisis to be about 70 trillion won.  
One can think of this sum as an estimate of the cost associated with the 
shortcomings of the financial resources allocation system that had existed 
until mid 1990s.  Also, the figure partly represents the cost of buying legal 
and market institutional frameworks to deal with bankruptcies and affected 
assets, which has been introduced since then.  
 
2.2. Macroeconomic and Financial Conditions of 2008 
 
The developments that adversely affected Korea‟s economy in 2008 were 
global in nature and thus were exogenous, sharing characteristics of the 1997 
crisis.  One way to see how extraordinarily conditions in global financial 
markets had worsened is to examine indicators of credit risks.  Figure 4 shows 
both the so called „Ted spread‟ (spread between 3-month London interbank 
lending rate and yield on 3-month US Treasury bills) and Vix (uncertainty 
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Figure 4 Ted Spread and Vix (January 2, 1990-September 17, 2009) 
 
index which measures the cost of insuring against volatility in the S&P 500 
index traded in the Chicago Board of Options Exchange).  They are based 
on very widely available financial market prices for a long period of time, 
making them particularly useful to compare events at different points in time.  
As can be seen, the turmoil in the global financial markets (especially in 
September-October period) was truly unprecedented.  The effects of the 
1997 crisis on the global financial markets look insignificant in comparison. 
Such an extraordinary event indeed created a difficult situation for the 
Korean economy that has become more externally oriented in trade as well as 
financial transactions over the past decade.  As can be seen in figures 1 
(interest rates) and 2 (exchange rate), even before the failure of the Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, both FX and domestic financial markets started 
to show elevated volatility.  Given that there had not been notably 
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problematic developments in domestic real and/or financial sectors, 
increasing exchange rate variability and credit premia on internationally 
traded Korean papers must have reflected concerns about Korean firms and 
banks‟ expected difficulties derived from the global financial crisis.  We 
will come back to the issues related to external finances after perusing 
macroeconomic conditions before 2008 first.  
Korea‟s domestic landscape, however, looked much different from a 
decade ago.  Perhaps the most important change has been an absence of a 
noticeable business failure, or a near failure that threatens soundness of the 
financial system.  Large Korean businesses, most of whom are also the main 
exporters, had been experiencing an export boom, surfing the waves of 
strong growth of the global economy that grew at 5% both 2006 and 2007 in 
real terms (IMF data).  China‟s strong growth translated into growing 
demand for industrial goods Korea was producing.  The manufacturing 
sector, low profitability and high debt ratio of whose member firms were one 
of key symbols of problems ten years ago, now boasted high profitability and 
low debt burden.  For example, the interest coverage ratio, which shows 
operating profit relative to interest expenses, of Korean manufacturers stood 
above 400% since 2004, while the same for the US manufacturers for 2008 
was 311%.
11)
  
Despite the overall healthy appearance, two areas of businesses and their 
adverse implications on the financial sector were a cause for concern in 2008.  
One was the shipbuilding industry whose breakneck growth since 2003 led to 
too many small startups as the industry‟s orders passed the peak by 2008.  
The other was an overhang from a by-gone boom, namely, in residential 
construction markets.  Even though the construction boom that took place in 
Korea was much more muted compared to the US‟s housing markets until 
                                           
11) However, as can be seen in table 3, such an improvement in financial health of businesses 
has come at a cost in terms of lower physical capital formation.  From 1980 to the 1997 
currency crisis, the average fixed capital investment in Korea was 11.6% which was far 
greater than the U.S (8.6%) and Japan (4.6%).  But after the 1997 crisis, from 1997 to 
2004, while Korea‟s annual economic growth rate was 4.1%, the average growth rate of the 
fixed capital investment was only 0.8%.  
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2006, house prices in Seoul area rose rapidly for several years up to 2006 and 
led to a modest residential construction boom in other areas in Korea.  A 
stock of unsold apartment units grew, and many builders got into trouble.  
As they relied heavily on financing from pooled loans from smaller savings 
banks, concerns grew about the potential non-performing loans and troubled 
assets.  However, this has not evolved into a much significant problem.  
For one, rules of mortgage lending were far more restrictive.  For example, 
the loan to value ratio (i.e., the amount of collateral value allowed out of the 
market price of the property to be purchased) was held below 60-70%, so 
lending was more properly secured.  Also, the rise in house prices was 
limited compared to the US and most other OECD countries.  The financial 
regulatory authorities took actions and implemented measures to address the 
problem starting in December 2008.  It involved selecting 70 suspect firms 
in construction and shipbuilding industries, and their viability was assessed 
after which appropriate measures were implemented.  
An apparently healthier picture notwithstanding, a sharp fall in the 
exchange value of the Korean won due to rising demand for the US dollar in 
the fall of 2008 eerily reminded one of events a decade earlier.  Also, the 
issue of large external short term borrowings became a potentially serious 
destabilizing problem.  Many in the international financial press took to the 
critical view that Korean banks relied on foreign borrowings to aggressively 
expand their asset base through lending to households this time, whereas it 
was lending to businesses (and non-extension of maturing loans by 
international lenders), that ultimately led to FX reserve shortage problems a 
decade ago.  
However, a closer look at data shows that the trend has been paced not 
only by Korean banks but branches of foreign banks in Korea as well, and 
thus the accusations have been misplaced.  As can be seen in table 4, short 
term borrowings by Korean banks rose from U$28 billion in 2005 to U$66.3 
billion in the second quarter of 2008.  The comparable figures for branches 
of foreign banks were U$23.3 billion in 2005 and U$80.3 billion in the 
second quarter of 2008.  This stands in stark contrast to patterns seen in long 
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Table 4 Details of External Borrowing (1994-1998, 2005-2009Q2) 
(Unit: end of period balances, U$ billion) 
 
Korean Banks 
Foreign Bank 
Branches 
Nonbank Private 
Corp. 
Short Long Short Long Short Long 
1994 17.9 16.3 11.8 2.1 8.3 21.5 
1995 28.5 25.0 15.7 2.6 10.3 26.2 
1996 42.1 35.0 18.9 3.2 14.5 31.6 
1997Q1 44.1 36.6 20.2 3.2 15.1 34.1 
1997Q2 47.2 39.0 20.8 3.4 15.2 35.5 
1997Q3 41.6 41.8 23.0 3.6 14.8 37.7 
1997Q4 27.3 38.0 21.9 3.8 13.7 38.1 
1998 15.0 38.5 16.0 2.8 7.2 36.9 
2005 27.9 30.4 23.3 1.7 8.6 58.9 
2006 44.2 37.8 51.8 2.5 9.1 69.8 
2007 54.6 54.3 79.3 4.5 10.4 94.3 
2008Q1 62.6 59.2 87.5 4.7 11.2 99.1 
2008Q2 66.3 60.9 80.3 3.7 11.8 99.4 
2008Q3 65.6 57.8 94.0 3.2 12.5 103.6 
2008Q4 45.2 54.1 67.7 4.5 13.8 105.6 
2009Q1 38.3 53.6 65.4 4.4 15.3 102.8 
2009Q2 39.7 57.0 66.3 4.8 14.9 101.9 
Source: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr). 
 
term borrowings by both parties.  Korean banks‟ long term borrowings rose 
from U$30.4 billion to U$61 billion, while they were U$1.7 billion in 2005 
and U$ 3.7 billion for foreign bank branches in the second quarter of 2008.  
Throughout this period, external borrowings by private corporations have 
been mostly in the long maturity category.  Therefore, it is the branches of 
foreign banks along with Korean banks that led the upsurge in short term 
external borrowings in recent years.  Such a pattern is very different from 
the one we saw in the period leading up to 1997 when Korean banks were the 
leading short term borrowers by a large margin compared to foreign bank 
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branches as well as nonbank private corporations as can be seen in table 4.  
This time around, it was a big surge in short term borrowings of branches of 
foreign banks in Korea that set the trend.  
The criticism of the foreign financial press is valid to the extent that 
foreign bank branches were mainly engaged in arbitrage transactions while 
Korean banks were using the funds for expanding domestic lending.  And 
also Korean banks can be criticized to the extent that their inter-bank 
borrowings cannot be as easily revolved as those of the foreign branches 
(whose borrowings are basically intra-bank transactions).  However, while 
short term borrowings by Korean banks grew from U$42 billion to U$60 
billion between 1996 and 2007, the FX reserves grew 6 folds, exports treble, 
and GDP doubled in the same period.  Therefore it seems too harsh to view 
increases in Korean banks short term borrowings over this period excessive 
only by looking at the absolute amount.  
Turning to macroeconomic conditions again, one can see a sharp 
deceleration in domestic spending in 2008, lowering its contribution to 
growth compared to earlier years, while that of net exports has gone up 
compared to their respective averages since 2001.  An overwhelming 
impact of the drop-off in private domestic demand can be seen clearly in 
table 5.  In addition to a big contribution of net exports, increases in 
government spending substantially added to growth.  Enhanced contribution 
of the net exports was due to the fact that imports fell more than exports thus 
giving rise to trade surpluses.  Such a positive role played by the external 
sector reminds one of similar but quantitatively much more significant role 
played by the rise in exports in 1998 as shown in table 1.  A big negative 
contribution of shrinking private domestic spending is almost identical this 
time as in 1998.  What is different this time is the quite substantial 
contribution made by increased government spending that added 1.74 
percentage point to growth, more than twice the average since 2001.  
A positive role played by fiscal policy was matched by monetary policy 
actions.  The short term policy interest rate, which was 5.25% August 2008 
had been lowered to 2% by early 2009.  In addition, a watered down version 
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Table 5 Contribution to GDP Growth (2001-20091H) 
 
Private 
Domestic 
Demand 
Gov‟t 
Spending 
Domestic 
Demand 
Net Exports 
GDP 
Growth 
2001 2.65 1.06 3.72 0.48 4.0 
2002 7.36 0.61 7.97 –0.70 7.2 
2003 0.36 1.23 1.58 0.91 2.8 
2004 0.88 0.64 1.53 2.65 4.6 
2005 3.31 0.45 3.75 0.26 4.0 
2006 4.19 0.57 4.77 0.34 5.2 
2007 3.72 0.79 4.51 0.72 5.1 
2008 0.88 0.44 1.32 1.05 2.2 
Average 2.92 0.72 3.64 0.71 4.39 
2009 
1st Half 
–9.22 1.74 –7.48 3.51 –3.17 
Source: Bank of Korea, GDP measured in 2000 prices. 
 
of quantitative easing, such as expanding the list of papers purchased in open 
market operations by the central bank, to boost liquidity has been 
implemented.  A key step taken by authorities was to supply foreign 
exchanges on an emergency basis to Korean banks that were having dollar 
funding difficulties.  Most importantly, currency swap facilities established 
with the US, Japan and Chinese central banks in November and December 
2008 had real calming effects on the FX market.  Thanks to the policy 
measures, foreign exchange and financial markets started to stabilize in the 
early spring of 2009, helped along by growing indications that international 
financial markets were thawing and coming back to life out of the deep freeze.  
Real activity has hardly started to recover from the sudden and sharp 
contraction seen in the fourth quarter of 2008, with the exception of export 
shipment, as can be seen in figure 5.  A rise in unemployment has been 
pronounced.  These sluggish indicators underscore the importance of the 
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Figure 5 Trend in Monthly Real Activity Indicators  
(January 2007-September 2009) 
(Unit: y-o-y growth rate, %) 
 
Source: National Statics Office website. 
 
government‟s spending increase in undergirding the real sector activity in 
2009 on a temporary basis.  
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3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TWO CRISES 
 
3.1. Output Trend 
 
Perhaps the most serious concern from the macroeconomic perspective 
about the recent crisis is not what happened during the event but its potential 
impact on Korea‟s growth trend.  Temporary output and job losses indeed 
have important welfare consequences, but less so compared to adverse 
consequences that influence output and consumption over a long time to 
come.  This is a serious possibility in view of what happened to the GDP 
trend since the 1997 crisis.  Figure 6 shows two interesting trends in the 
quarterly real GDP since 1985 to third quarter of 2009.  
Both trends were calculated following way.  For trend 97, the Hodrick-
Prescott filter was applied to logged quarterly real GDP data from 1970Q1 to 
1996Q4 (date shown by the first vertical line).  Then an AR(1) was fitted 
to the trend component estimated from the HP filter.  Lastly, the AR(1) was 
 
Figure 6 Quarterly Real GDP and Trends (1980Q1-2009Q3) 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
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projected forward to obtain the trend line A.  This line can be viewed as a 
hypothetical path of real GDP had events around 1997 not happened.  For 
trend 08, the same procedure was repeated using data from 1970Q1 to 
2007Q4 (date shown by the second vertical line). 
The output consequences of the 1997 crisis is easy to see; real GDP 
dropped off sharply in 1998 then recovered quite briskly in the following 
couple of years.  However, when compared to the trend line A, the recovery 
was not sufficient to reach the old trend, and more significantly, the gap 
between the trend growth (line A) and the actual growth started to get wider 
as time passed.  The average growth rate of the trend line A is the same as 
that of actual data before 1997, 7.6%, whereas the average growth for the 
1999-2007 period has been 4.7%, and thus two lines that grow at different 
rates will move more apart as time passes.  This is a clear illustration that 
the events of 1997 not only had severely reduced spending and economic 
activity in the following year, but had a lasting impact on the pattern of 
output growth.  A general perception of such a shift has been that what went 
on in Korea‟s financial and corporate sectors was not sustainable before 1997 
and it was natural that Korea‟s growth decelerated.  This seems to be a 
widely accepted view, but there is paucity of theoretical or empirical 
explanations except the actual outcome of slower growth. Perhaps that is 
enough evidence.
12)
 
But now we are facing an interesting possibility.  The 2008 crisis was 
marked by a sharp fall in output though not as severe as 1998 but still the 
most pronounced one since then.  What kind path is the real GDP going to 
take?  Is it going to get back to the trend line B, proving the event of 2008 a 
temporary shortfall, or is it going to remain below the B line but growing at 
the same rate to form a parallel line?  Or are we going to follow the new 
path which slowly diverges from the line B as the average growth rate falls 
below that of the trend line B as in the case of the post 1998 period?  The 
more optimistic scenario would be that the real GDP rises above the trend 
                                           
12) For some examples of empirical examinations of the trend output or potential GDP since 
1997, see Huh and Park (2003), Kwark (2007), Kim and Noh (2007).  
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line B over time so that at least some of the divergence between the lines A 
and B is narrowed.  This would be possible if we have 5-6% growth for 
awhile, for example.  
These are all possible future trajectories each with serious welfare 
implications.  For one, the slower the average growth rate, the longer it will 
take for Korea‟s GNI per capita to catch up with those of advanced OECD 
economies.  Furthermore, it will make demands for more limited resources 
among interest groups (i.e., young vs. old, welfare payment vs. tax cut, Seoul 
capital area vs. the rest of country) ever more competitive, adding to the 
trend of eroding social cohesion and sharpening social tensions that have 
become a source of serious concerns for many in the country in recent years. 
 
3.2. Employment Trend 
 
Another macroeconomic trend that has serious implications is that of 
employment.  Especially job creation, or lack thereof, has been a focal point 
of the recovery that is taking place in the US and other economies.  
Concerns about the so called „jobless recovery‟ already had been important 
in many economies even before the current episode of contraction and 
recovery.  However, in Korea, the trend of employment growth seemed to 
have shifted lower some time back. 
First is the appearance of a level shift in the employment rate (shown in 
figure 7), which measures total number of the employed over the size of 
population over 15-years old, before and after the 1997 crisis.  This ratio is 
already lower than most OECD member countries, signifying a low level of 
labor force utilization.  Instead of the labor utilization ratio growing, which 
one would expect of an economy still growing at a higher rate than most 
OECD countries, we are seeing it stuck at a lower level.  
Second, the growth rate of total employment itself has been variable 
between 1997 and 2004.  The big fluctuation has to do with the 1997 crisis 
and the second and smaller episode was related to the credit card bubble and 
bust in 2002-2003.  However, if one connects the trend shown before 2007 
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Figure 7 Employment related Trends (1995Q1-2009Q3) (%) 
Source: National Statics Office website. 
  
with that drawn for post 2004 period, it is going to have a distinctly 
downward slope.  More precisely, the period average of the employment 
growth rate for 1995Q1-1996Q4 was 2.5%, whereas it was 1.4% for 2004Q1-
2007Q4. 
Such a trend, combined with the fact that the most distinct demographic 
trends in Korea are very rapid ageing and a very low birth rate, have not so 
pleasant and serious implications.  For one, as the number of people who 
work decreases, the social burden of providing for older generation per 
worker is going to grow faster.  The size of the burden itself would also 
grow faster as less and less ageing individuals would be working and making 
private provisions, at least partly, for their retirement. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Two economic crises that visited the Korean economy have given rise to 
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pressing challenges.  As Korea‟s economy becomes more developed and, at 
the same time, more outwardly oriented, external shocks seem to create ever 
more serious domestic turmoil.  Increased vulnerability might come 
unavoidably with increased openness.  However, if every external shock 
leaves indelible adverse marks on basic tenets of the country‟s economy such 
as potential output, the long term economic outlook is very bleak. 
What happens with respect to the trend growth trajectory in the post 2008 
period is a point of great interest in this regards.  In the wake of the 1997 
crisis, both economists and policy makers took to the view that the pre-crisis 
period growth trend was not sustainable and deceleration in growth was to be 
welcomed for a more stable profile of economic performance over time. 
Despite the distinctly lower growth profile since late 1990s, Korea‟s 
economy ran into difficulties in 2003 due to a domestic cause (credit card 
burble and bust) and again in 2008 due to a truly large external shock.  This 
suggests that the improvements in the soundness of Korean economy might 
have been somewhat limited. 
Several factors appear to have contributed to the puzzling result that 
Korea‟s economy fared much better in the aftermath of 2008 shock, which 
has been much more severe than the 1997 crisis by any metric.  One, Korea 
in 2008 was not encumbered by the „70 trillion won‟ problem of non-
performing assets that was uncovered through messy restructuring processes 
following the 1997-1998 crisis.  Of course there is going to be reckoning of 
non-performing assets this time around too as government‟s active 
intervention and assistance since late 2008 surely have postponed eventual 
realization of losses.  However, for now the order of magnitude of hidden 
problem is expected to be much less than that of the pre-1997 period.  For 
one, many businesses have maintained healthy finances mainly due to robust 
export performances for several years before 2008.  
Two, comparatively speaking, policy reactions were prompt and offered 
sufficient resources to stop the economy‟s downward spiral.  This aspect 
stands in strong contrast to the situations of 1997-1998, when interest rates 
were hiked over 20% while this time it was lowered to 2% from above 5% in 
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about 6 months.
13)
  Fiscal assistance came late and timid in 1998 whereas a 
large supplementary spending package came in early 2008 at the heel of the 
regular annual budget, adding close to 2% point to the first half growth.  
Furthermore, steps were taken to allay heightened fear of another foreign 
exchange crisis which could have easily turned into a potentially dangerous 
self-fulfilling expectation.  Particularly useful was establishing currency 
swap facilities with the central banks of the US, Japan and China. 
Three, very aggressive policy coordination among leading economies to 
counter the global financial freeze and its adverse impact on real activity has 
helped through two channels.  First, it allowed a relatively rapid recovery of 
an orderly flow of financial capital in and out of Korea, and put a floor to 
how far Korea‟s exports fell as a consequence of the global slowdown. 
Second, it emboldened Korean policy makers to implement market 
stabilization measures as well as macroeconomic supports.  This is a very 
different picture compared to a decade ago when local policy makers would 
typically mention „consultation with the IMF‟ somewhere in their responses 
to policy related questions.  Establishing currency swap arrangements and 
thus allowing provision of foreign exchanges on a more normal basis, instead 
of the mode of emergency credit facilities a la 1997 IMF assistance, has had 
quite important salutary effects.  
It is needless to say that these factors are still conjectures, requiring more 
systematic examination for their quantitative importance.  Of course 
empirical approach might have to find tractable ways to examine these issues. 
For example it might be difficult to examine a quantitative significance of the 
third point that is decidedly a qualitative observation.  However, comparing 
experiences of the other three countries that received emergency IMF 
funding in 1997, then and now would be doable.  This examination could 
shed some light on to what extent Korea‟s outcome in the aftermath of 2008 
crisis really is unique. 
                                           
13) See Chopra et al. (2002) for an extensive explanation about macroeconomic policy 
consultations between the Korean government and the IMF, and other IMF perspectives on 
issues of 1997-1998 period. 
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